‘Reasonably Foreseeable’ Victim Evidence

Reasonably Foreseeable Victim Evidence1.DavinaDavina must uprise that her depression is medically-recognised (McLoughlin v. OBrian (1983)) caused by the accident and that she was a reasonably foreseeable victim. She must also show that her injury would be foreseeable in a person of valid fortitude (Page v. Smith (1996)). Davina is a secondary victim (Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992)) so must establish a close relationship between herself and Bertram, proximity to the accident and that her injury came through sight or hearing of it. Bertram is Davinas brother Davina heard the accident and tended to(p) immediately afterwards thereof her claim should succeed,Whitchester District CouncilThe pothole may constitute a breach of the Councils duty under section 41 of the Highways Act 1980 to maintain ways maintainable at public expense. However, section 58 provides a defence if the Council took reasonable charge to secure that the part of the highway was not da ngerous to traffic. Therefore, if the Council carries out regular inspection and makes timely repairs it will agree fulfilled its duty.EthelredEthelred may be vicariously liable for Conrads negligence, since Conrad is an employee (Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v. subgenus Pastor of Pensions and National Insurance (1968)) acting in the course of employment although Conrad had finished his deliveries, he was going back to the depot and thusly not on a frolic of his own (Joel v. Morrison (1834)).ConradConrad owed Bertram the recognised duty between road users (Caparo v. Dickman (1990)) and must reach the standard of a reasonably adapted device driver (Nettleship v. Weston (1971)). Conrad was hurrying back to the depot suggesting he was speeding or driving carelessly particularly since he was unable to stop in time.In a case involving multiple causes of injury, Bertram only needs to show that a breach materially contributed to the damage (Bonnington Castings Ltd v. Wardlaw (1 956)). Running Bertram over with his lorry would cause a reasonably foreseeable (The Wagon Mound (No 1) (1961)) material contribution to his injuries which would not have occurred but for Conrads negligence (Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management (1969)).AlphonseAlphonse owed Bertram the recognised efficacious duty of care between road users (Caparo) and must show the same standard of care as a reasonably competent and experienced driver (Nettleship v. Weston). There is nothing to suggest that Alphonse was driving carelessly before hitting the pothole. It is unlikely that he will be liable to Bertram.It is likely that his broken carpus would be too remote for financial obligation to arise (Wagon Mound). Alphonse should have been aware of the difficulties walking whilst wearing a neck collar and taken extra care on stairs.BertramBy stepping into the road without looking, Bertram could be considered to be contributorily negligent. The existence of a duty of care is i rrelevant (Jones v. Livox (1952). If Bertram is found to be contributorily negligent any remediation will be reduced to the extent that his carelessness caused his injuries, considering the relative blameworthiness of the parties.(500 words)2. Private nuisancePrivate nuisance can be defined as unlawful interference with use or enjoyment of land. The claimant must be the landowner (Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd (1997)) and the interference must be an unreasonable give in of affairs causing damage or personal discomfort as a result.Lordly is the landowner. Frequent bonfires will constitute a state of affairs. In considering whether this is unreasonable, the character of the neighbourhood will be considered (St Helens Smelting Co v. Tipping (1865)) in relation to the degree and type of interference that could be expected in that locality. It is likely that support burning of tyres on village outskirts would be unreasonable. Lordly has been unable to enjoy his garden because of the smel l smell is recognised as a recognised kinfolk of nuisance (Wheeler v. JJ Saunders Ltd (1996)). Sumpoil would be liable as the creator of the nuisance.Chip will not be able to bring a claim for disruption to his active phone as he is not the landowner.Public nuisancePublic nuisance can be defined as nuisance which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of a class of Her Majestys subjects (A-G v. PYA Quarries Ltd (1957)). Road users have been held to constitute a class (Castle v. St Augustines Links (1922)). Moreover, the claimant must have suffered special (particular) damage, which must be different in nature or extent from that suffered by the rest of the class. The smoke has adversely affected visibility for drivers and thus affects their convenience Lordly has suffered further damage and could therefore bring a claim in public nuisance against Sumpoil.HarassmentSection 3 of the security from Harassment Act 1997 creates a statutory tort of harassment, satisfi ed if the defendant pursues a course of conduct (on at least two occasions (section 7(3)) that causes some other to experience harassment. Such conduct can include words (section 7(4)). Therefore, Chips frequent swearing at Sumpoil may give rise to liability for harassment if it caused Sumpoil to feel harassed, alarmed or distressed.Assault and batteryBattery is defined as the intentional direct application of force to another person. An encounter is an act which causes the reasonable apprehension of infliction of a battery. Sumpoil walked up to Chip carrying a large wrench.. If Chip reasonably apprehended that Sumpoil was going to hit him, indeed Sumpoil would be liable for assault. Chip punching Sumpoil on the nose would constitute a battery, and, if Sumpoil apprehended the punch, would also give rise to an assault.Interference with businessLordly interfered with the issue of goods to Sumpoils business and may be liable for the tort of interfering with business if he knew of t he existence of the contract and intend to interfere with its performance (Merkur Island deportation Corp v. Laughten(1983)) without sufficient justification, leading to an actual breach of contract, causing damage. However, it is not clear whether the delays in delivery constituted a breach of contract or whether Sumpoil suffered resulting loss.(500 words)List of casesA-G v. PYA Quarries Ltd 1957 1 All ER 894Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management 1969 1 QB 428Bonnington Castings Ltd v. Wardlaw 1956 AC 613Caparo v. Dickman 1990 1 All ER 568Castle v. St Augustines Links (1922) 38 TLR 615Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd 1997 AC 655Joel v. Morrison (1834) 6 C P 501Jones v. Livox Quarries 1952 2 QB 608McLoughlin v. OBrian 1983 AC 410Merkur Island Shipping Corp v. Laughten1983 2 AC 570Nettleship v. Weston 1971 2 QB 691Page v. Smith 1996 1 AC 155Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v. Minister of Pensions and Nat ional Insurance 1968 1 All ER 433St Helens Smelting Co v. Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642The Wagon Mound (No 1) 1961 1 All ER 404Wheeler v. JJ Saunders Ltd 1996 Ch 19BibliographyHowarth, DR and OSullivan, JA (2003) Heppel Howarth Matthews Tort Cases Materials (5th edition), LexisNexis Butterworths, LondonMullis A and Oliphant K (2003) Torts (3rd edition), Palgrave Macmillan, BasingstokeRogers WVH (2002) Winfield Jolowicz on Tort (16th edition), Sweet and Maxwell, London